Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships ∗ by David Rahman et al.
Secret Contracts for Ecient Partnerships
David Rahmany and Ichiro Obara
University of Minnesota
First Submission: November 6, 2005.
This Draft: June 12, 2008.
Abstract
By allocating dierent information to team members, secret contracts can
provide better incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational design.
For instance, they may help to monitor monitors, and appoint secret princi-
pals. More generally, secret contracts highlight a rich duality between detection
and enforcement with linear transfers. On the one hand, every disobedient de-
viation must be detectable to enforce an an outcome, but dierent behavior
may be used to detect dierent deviations. On the other, every disobedient
deviation must be attributable, i.e., some player can be identied as innocent
after the deviation, to provide incentives with budget balance.
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1 Introduction
Ann owns a restaurant. She hires Bob to tally the till every night and report back
any mismatch between the till and that night's bills. Ann can motivate Bob to exert
such eort and report truthfully any mismatch by sometimes secretly taking money
from the till herself and oering him the following incentive scheme: if Ann took
some money, she will pay Bob his wage only when he reports a mismatch; if Ann did
not take any money, she will pay Bob only when a mismatch is not reported.
Bob faces a secret contract: his report-contingent wage is unknown to him a priori
(it depends on whether or not Ann secretly took some money). If Bob fails to exert
eort, he won't know what to report in order to secure his wage. However, if he does
his job he'll discover whether or not there is a mismatch and deduce from this Ann's
behavior. Only after tallying the till will Bob know what to report in order to receive
his wage, which turns out to be optimally truthful.
This paper studies contracts like Bob's1 and how they might help organizations to
function productively. By allocating dierent information to team members, secret
contracts often provide better incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational
design. Thus, they give Bob incentives to acquire costly information and reveal it, and
provide Ann with enough a priori knowledge to distinguish working from shirking.
In general, they provide a way to \monitor the monitor" (Section 2.1), and can yield
approximately ecient partnerships by appointing a \secret principal" (Section 2.2).
Consider a hypothetical organization whose individuals are subject to moral hazard
but with rich communication protocols: access to (i) a disinterested mediator or ma-
chine that makes condential, veriable but non-binding recommendations to players,
and (ii) (linear) \money" transfers that may depend on the mediator's recommenda-
tions and individual reports (such as Bob's). A contract thus involves instructions
and payments:, i.e., a way of telling people what to do and a way of rewarding them.
When can this organization actually overcome moral hazard with secret contracts?
1These contracts are pervasive. For instance, TSA screeners are evaluated with \covert testing"
(TSA, 2004, p. 5); police use young `drinkers' to ensure that bartenders check IDs (Cheslow, 2005).
1Below, we study incentives in such a team to answer this question in various contexts.
Formally, we consider contractual arrangements subject to incentive compatibility
as described by Myerson's (1986) communication equilibrium. We obtain minimal
conditions on a team's primitives|its \monitoring technology" (what Bob can see
when) and individual preferences (whether Bob prefers to work or shirk)|such that
incentive compatibility is not a binding constraint for the team.
Theorem 1 provides a necessary and sucient condition on a monitoring technology|
called detecting unilateral disobedience (DUD)|for every team outcome (e.g., Bob
works) to be approximately enforceable, i.e., an incentive compatible outcome exists
arbitrarily close to it. DUD requires that every disobedient deviation by any indi-
vidual be statistically detectable with some reaction by others, although dierent
deviations may be detected with dierent reactions. This key property distinguishes
DUD substantively from the literature2 (Section 3.1 has a detailed literature review).
Therefore, DUD is a weak restriction. It is also generic (Theorem 2).
Secret contracts add value not by approximate enforcement (Corollaries 1 and 4),3
but by allowing \monitors" to follow \deviators" in a hypothetical game of hide and
seek, even though in fact they move simultaneously. To illustrate, suppose Bob shirks.
If he also reports no mismatch then Ann can hypothetically \react" by secretly taking
some money to prove him wrong, whereas if he reports a mismatch then Ann can
choose not to take any money. By Theorem 1, such disobedience (e.g., Bob shirking)
is detectable in this sense if and only if obedience is enforceable with secret contracts.
Restricting attention to budget-balanced transfers,4 Theorem 3 characterizes approx-
imate enforcement of any team outcome with a stronger condition, called identifying
obedient players (IOP). In addition to DUD, IOP requires that after any unilateral
disobedience, someone can be statistically identied as obedient. IOP is weak (this
is argued at the end of Section 3.2) and generic (Theorem 5), too. Intuitively, IOP
provides incentives with budget balance by rewarding the innocent while punishing
all others. Since IOP is necessary to deliver incentives, it exhausts the informational
economies from determining \who didn't dunnit" rather than, say, \who dunnit."5
2For instance, conditions like individual full rank of Fudenberg et al. (1994) require that every
deviation be detected by the same \reaction," making it more dicult to detect deviations.
3Even though we sometimes rely on approximation to expand contractual possibilities, our key
insight is the use of mediated transfers|not approximating outcomes|to provide incentives.
4Budget balance means that the sum payments across individuals always equals zero.
5E.g., conditions based on pairwise full rank of Fudenberg et al. (1994) require that the deviator
be statistically identied after every unilateral deviation, which is clearly stricter than IOP.
2Theorems 6 and 8 (Section 4) extend these results in two important directions that
help to clarify the dierences between exact and approximate enforcement.
Theorem 6 characterizes monitoring technologies that approximately enforce a xed
outcome rather than every outcome simultaneously (Theorem 1), regardless of indi-
vidual preferences. Interestingly, Theorem 6 reconciles an innite regress inherent
in monitoring. Suppose that providing incentives for a given outcome requires a
monitor to detect deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? Theorem 6
answers this question by asserting that eectively the monitor's deviations are ir-
relevant. Indeed, if they are detectable then they can be easily discouraged with
contingent payments. Otherwise, if the monitor's deviations are undetectable then
the deviations themselves still detect others' deviations from the given outcome, and
so they continue to fulll the required monitoring role. Evidently, this argument also
applies to the monitor's deviations from these deviations, and so forth. Theorem 6
reconciles this innite regress by showing that under standard conditions (e.g., in a
nite game) not every behavior by the monitor can have a protable, undetectable
deviation. Therefore, to approximately enforce an arbitrary outcome with infrequent
monitoring, every deviation from the outcome must in principle be detectable with
some monitoring behavior, but deviations away from the monitoring behavior itself
need not be detectable. Heuristically, nobody needs to monitor the monitor.
Theorem 8 extends Theorem 6 by xing individual preferences and nding joint con-
ditions on preferences and the monitoring technology that characterize approximate
enforcement. Intuitively, protable deviations must be discouraged \uniformly" and
\credibly." Uniform detection allows for innitesimal deviations to be discouraged
even if they are only innitesimally detectable (Example 9). Credibility is necessary
when deviations are discouraged with the use of others' actions rather than with
contingent payments, and this disciplining behavior must be incentive compatible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents two motivating examples that
guide our main results. Section 3 develops the model. Section 3.1 denes DUD,
characterizes its incentive properties, nds conditions for its generic satisfaction, and
relates it to the literature. Section 3.2 repeats this exercise for IOP. Section 4 extends
the model by characterizing exact and approximate enforcement of xed outcomes
with and without xed preferences, and accommodates complications such as par-
ticipation constraints, limited liability, and even coalitional deviations. Section 5
concludes. Omitted proofs and ancillary results appear in Appendices A and B.
32 Examples
We begin our analysis of secret contracts with two leading examples that attempt to
capture the intuition behind our main results, Theorems 1 and 3. The rst example
considers an environment that typies the strategic interaction between a principal,
a worker, and a monitor. The second example suggests an intuitive way of attaining
approximately ecient partnerships with budget balance.
2.1 Robinson and Friday
There are two agents: Robinson, who can either monitor or rest, and Friday, who can
either work or shirk. A mediating principal makes possibly secret recommendations to
the agents and enforces contingent contractual payments. Robinson (the row player)
and Friday (the column player) interact according to the left bi-matrix below.
work shirk work shirk
monitor 2; 1  1;0 monitor 1;0 0;1
rest 3; 1 0;0 rest 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2
Utility Payos Signal Probabilities
There are two signals, g and b, on which to condition linear transfers. Their condi-
tional probability is given in the right bi-matrix above. In words, if Robinson monitors
he observes Friday's eort, whereas if he rests then the signal is uninformative.
Although clearly the ecient prole (rest,work) is unenforceable, we can get arbi-
trarily close even if only Robinson observes the signal and it is not veriable.6 For
the principal to write signal-contingent contracts, he must rst solicit the realizations
from Robinson, who may in principle misreport them.7 We approximate (rest,work)
by having Friday mix between working and shirking and Robinson's report-contingent
payments depend on Friday's recommendation, thereby \monitoring the monitor."
Specically, the following correlated strategy is incentive compatible given  2 (0;1):
6If signals are publicly veriable, the correlated strategy [(monitor,work)]+(1 )[(rest,work)],
where [a] means Dirac measure for any action prole a, is enforced for all  2 (0;1] with Holmstr om's
(1982) group penalties, e.g., by paying Robinson $2 and Friday $1= if g and both players $0 if b.
7Now group penalties break down, since then Robinson reports g and rests, hence Friday shirks.
Furthermore, if Robinson was paid independently of his report then although he would happily tell
the truth, he would nd no reason to monitor.
4(i) Robinson is told to monitor with probability  (and rest with probability 1   ),
(ii) Friday is independently told to work with probability  (to shirk with 1 ), and
(iii) the principal enforces the following secret contract:
(monitor,work) (monitor,shirk) (rest,work) (rest,shirk)
g 1=;1= 0;0 0;0 0;0
b 0;0 1=(1   );0 0;0 0;0
The table reads as follows. The leftmost column says that Robinson is paid $1= if he
reports g and $0 if b when (monitor,work) was recommended, whereas Friday is paid
$1= if g is reported and $0 if b, etc. Honesty and obedience to the mediator is now
incentive compatible. Letting  ! 0 and  ! 1, (rest,work) can now be approached.
Intuitively, Robinson is rewarded only when he reports g if Friday was asked to work
and b if Friday was asked to shirk. Robinson, like Bob, faces a \trick question."
Secret contracts add value in this example because they allow dierent correlated
strategies to detect dierent deviation plans, unlike just signal-contingent contracts.
In other words, this is as if a correlated strategy is chosen after players choose de-
viation plans in order to detect them. To illustrate, suppose that Robinson is asked
to monitor but instead chooses to rest and report g. The mediator can \react" by
asking Friday to shirk, which would lead to b if Robinson monitored and reported
truthfully. Similarly, if Robinson plans to rest and report b then Friday can be asked
to work instead, and Robinson's deviation is detected again.
The key idea behind Theorem 1 shows that, therefore, Robinson can be dissuaded
from resting. However, with only signal-contingent contracts (Corollary 1), detecting
Robinson's deviations requires the principal to x Friday's behavior in advance. If
Friday works with xed probability  then Robinson can rest and report g with
probability . Now Robinson can deviate without being detected, and no contract
contingent only on signals can induce him to monitor.
2.2 Secret Principal
A team has n individuals. Each team member i can either work (ai = 1) or shirk
(ai = 0). Let c > 0 be each individual's cost of eort. Eort is not observable.
Output is publicly veriable and can be either good (g) or bad (b). The probability
of g equals P(
P
i ai), where P is a strictly increasing function of the sum of eorts.
5Radner et al. (1986) showed that in this environment there do not exist budget-
balanced output-contingent linear transfers to induce everyone to work, not even
approximately. One arrangement that is not approximately ecient but nevertheless
induces most people to work is appointing Holmstr om's principal. Call this player 1
and dene transfers as follows. For i = 2;:::;n, let i(g) = z and i(b) = 0 be player
i's output-contingent linear transfer, for some z  0. Let player 1's transfer equal
1 =  
n X
i=2
i:
By construction, the budget is balanced. It is easy to see that everyone but player 1
will work if z is suciently large. However, player 1 has the incentive to shirk.8
Allowing now for secret contracts, consider the following scheme. For any small " > 0,
a mediator asks every individual to work (call this event 1) with probability 1   ".
With probability "=n, he picks player i (everyone is picked with equal probability)
and secretly asks him to shirk, while asking all others to work (call this event 1 i).
For i = 1;:::;n, let i(gj1) = i(bj1) = 0 be player i's contingent transfer if the
mediator asked everyone to work. Otherwise, if player i was secretly told to shirk,
for j 6= i let j(gj1 i) = z and j(bj1 i) = 0 be player j's transfer. For player i, let
i =  
X
j6=i
j:
Clearly, this contract is budget-balanced. It is also incentive compatible. Indeed, it
is clear from the contract that asking a player to shirk is always incentive compatible.
If player i is recommended to work, incentive compatibility requires that
"
n(n   1)P(n   1)z   c  "
n(n   1)P(n   2)z;
which is satised if z is suciently large because P is strictly increasing. Under
this contract, everyone works with probability 1   ", for any " > 0, by choosing z
appropriately, so everyone working is approximated with budget balanced transfers.
If a worker deviates (i.e., shirks), he lowers the probability of g. If a secret principal
deviates (i.e., works) he raises the probability g. Hence, a worker's deviation changes
probabilities dierently from a secret principal's deviation, so after a deviation that
raises the frequency of g, innocence can be attributed to the secret principal. Secret
contracts add value by using dierent secret principals for dierent workers. This is
the insight exploited by IOP to establish Theorem 3 below.
8This contract follows Holmstr om's suggestion to the letter: player 1 is a \xed" principal who
absorbs the incentive payments to all others by \breaking" the budget constraint.
63 Model
This section develops the main model of secret contracts, whose purpose is to charac-
terize a team's enforceable outcomes. Firstly, basic notation is introduced, the timing
of interaction amongst team members is described explicitly, and several notions of
enforcement are formally dened that will be used extensively later.
Section 3.1 then extrapolates from the leading example in Section 2.1. A notion of
detection of deviation plans is introduced and the equivalence between detection and
enforcement is derived in terms of a hypothetical zero-sum game of hide and seek
where the hider (a deviator) moves rst and the seeker (a monitor) moves second.
Allowing the seeker to move second is shown to characterize the value of secret con-
tracts. Formally, an outcome is shown to be enforceable if and only if the seeker wins
in this hypothetical hide-and-seek game. A notion of \almost perfect monitoring" is
also proposed, called detecting unilateral disobedience, and conditions are provided
for it to obtain generically. Section 3.1 ends with a literature review.
Section 3.2 extends the results of Section 3.1 to include budget-balanced contracts
in the spirit of the secret principal from Section 2.2. There, a similar hide-and-seek
intuition emerges, except that now enforcement with budget balance is equated to
attribution rather than just detection. Intuitively, attribution is taken to mean that
it is possible to identify an obedient player after a deviation is detected.
We begin by dening the basic strategic environment. Let I = f1;:::;ng be a nite
set of players, Ai a nite set of actions available to any player i 2 I, and A =
Q
i Ai
the (nonempty) space of action proles. Let vi(a) denote the utility to player i 2 I
from action prole a 2 A. A correlated strategy is a probability measure  2 (A).9
Let Si be a nite set of private signals observable only by individual member i 2 I
and S0 a nite set of publicly veriable signals. Let
S :=
n Y
j=0
Sj
be the (nonempty) product space of all observable signals. A monitoring technology
is a measure-valued map Pr : A ! (S), where Pr(sja) stands for the conditional
probability that s = (s0;s1;:::;sn) 2 S was observed given that the team played
a = (a1;:::;an) 2 A.
9If X is a nite set, (X) = f 2 RX
+ :
P
x (x) = 1g is the set of probability vectors on X.
7Assume that the team has access to linear transfers. An incentive scheme is any
map  : I  A  S ! R that assigns monetary transfers contingent on individuals,
recommended actions, and reported signals. It is assumed that recommendations are
veriable.10 Rather than focus on incentive schemes , we will also study probability
weighted transfers,  : IAS ! R. For any recommendation a 2 A with (a) > 0,
one may think of  as solving i(a;s) = (a)i(a;s) for some . For any a 2 A with
(a) = 0 and (a) 6= 0, one may think of  as either arising from unbounded incentive
schemes (i.e., i(a;s) = 1) or as the limit of a sequence fmmg. This change of
variables from  to  is explained further in Section 4.1.
The timing of team members' interaction runs as follows. Firstly, players agree upon
some contract (;) consisting of a correlated strategy  and an incentive scheme . A
prole of recommendations is drawn according to  and made to players condentially
and veriably by some machine. Players then simultaneously take some action. Taken
actions are neither veriable nor directly observable. Next, players observe their
unveriable private signals and submit a veriable report of their observations (given
by a signal) before observing the public signal (not essential, just simplifying). Finally,
recommendation- and report-contingent transfers are made according to .
If every player obeys his recommendation and reports truthfully, the expected utility
to player i (before recommendations are actually made) from a contract (;) is
X
a2A
(a)vi(a)  
X
(a;s)
(a)i(a;s)Pr(sja):
Of course, Mr. i may disobey his recommendation ai to play some other action bi and
lie about his privately observed signal. A reporting strategy is a map i : Si ! Si,
where i(si) is the reported signal when Mr. i privately observes si. Let Ri be the
set of all reporting strategies for player i. The truthful reporting strategy is the
identity map i : Si ! Si with i(si) = si. Thus, both i(a;s i;i(si)) = i(a;s) and
i(a;s i;i(si)) = i(a;s).11 The space of pure deviations for i is therefore Ai  Ri.
For every player i and every deviation (bi;i), the conditional probability that signal
prole s will be reported when everyone else is honest and plays a i 2 A i equals
Pr(sja i;bi;i) :=
X
ti2 1
i (si)
Pr(s i;tija i;bi):
10If recommendations were not directly veriable, then players could be asked to announce theirs
as veriable messages. However, this would involve some loss of generality (Example 2).
11We will often use the notation s = (s i;si) and a = (a i;ai) for any i, where si 2 Si and
s i 2 S i =
Q
j6=i Sj; similarly for A i.
8When all other players are honest and obedient, the utility to i from deviating to
(bi;i) conditional on being recommended to play ai under contract (;) equals
X
a i
(a)
(ai)
vi(a i;bi)  
X
(a i;s)
(a)
(ai)
i(a;s)Pr(sja i;bi;i);
where (ai) =
P
a i (a) > 0 is the probability that ai was recommended.
A team's metering problem is to nd a contract (;) that makes incentive compatible
obeying recommended behavior as well as honest reporting of monitoring signals.
This is captured by the following family of inequalities.
8i 2 I;ai 2 Ai;(bi;i) 2 Ai  Ri;
X
a i
(a)(vi(a i;bi)   vi(a)) 
X
(a i;s)
(a)i(a;s)(Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja)): ()
The left-hand side reects the deviation gain in terms of utility12 for a player i from
playing bi when asked to play ai. The right-hand side reects his contractual loss
from deviating to (bi;i) relative to honesty and obedience (i.e., playing ai after being
asked to do so and reporting according to i). Such a loss originates from two sources.
On the one hand, playing bi instead of ai may change conditional probabilities over
signals. On the other, reporting according to i may aect conditional payments.
Denition 1. A correlated strategy  is exactly enforceable (or simply enforceable)
if there exists an incentive scheme  : I AS ! R to satisfy () for all (i;ai;bi;i).
Call  exactly enforceable with budget balance if it is exactly enforceable and
8(a;s);
X
i2I
i(a;s) = 0:
A correlated strategy  is approximately enforceable if a sequence fmg of enforceable
correlated strategies exists with m ! . Call  approximately enforceable with budget
balance if, in addition, every m is enforceable with budget balance.
A correlated strategy is approximately enforceable if it is the limit of exactly enforce-
able ones. E.g., in Section 2.1 the correlated strategy [(rest,work)] is approximately
enforceable but not enforceable. Approximate enforcement with budget balance re-
quires that the budget be balanced along the way, not just asymptotically. E.g., in
Section 2.2, everybody working is approximately enforceable with budget balance, but
not exactly enforceable with budget balance, even though it is exactly enforceable.
12Specically, in terms of probability weighted utility, weighted by (ai). If ai is never recom-
mended then (ai) = 0 and both sides of the inequality equal zero.
93.1 Detection
We now provide a notion of detection that is shown to be equivalent to enforcement.
A deviation plan for any player i is a map i : Ai ! (Ai  Ri), where i(bi;ijai)
stands for the probability that i deviates to (bi;i) when recommended to play ai.
Given  2 (A), let Pr() 2 RS be the vector dened by Pr()(s) =
P
a (a)Pr(sja).
Intuitively, Pr() is the vector of prior report probabilities if everyone is honest and
obediently playing according to . Let Pr(;i) 2 RS, dened pointwise by
Pr(;i)(s) =
X
a2A
(a)
X
(bi;i)
Pr(sja i;bi;i)i(bi;ijai);
be the vector of prior probabilities if player i deviates from  according to i.
A deviation plan i is disobedient if i(bi;ijai) > 0 for some ai 6= bi, i.e., it disobeys
some recommendation ai with positive probability. A disobedient deviation plan may
be \honest," i.e., i may equal i with probability one after every recommendation.
A prole  = (1;:::;n) of deviation plans is called disobedient if i is disobedient
for some player i. Although dishonesty is arguably a form of disobedience, it will be
useful in the sequel to distinguish between them.
Denition 2 (Detection). A deviation plan i for player i is called undetectable if
8 2 (A); Pr() = Pr(;i):
Call i detectable if it is not undetectable, i.e., Pr() 6= Pr(;i) for some  2 (A).
Intuitively, a deviation plan i is undetectable if the probability of reported signals
induced by i, Pr(;i), coincides with that arising from honesty and obedience,
Pr(), regardless of the team's correlated strategy, , assuming that others are honest
and obedient. Undetectability is arguably a strong restriction on a deviation plan,
making detectability a weak requirement.13 We now give our rst main denition.
Denition 3 (DUD). A monitoring technology Pr detects unilateral disobedience
(DUD) if every disobedient deviation plan is detectable.
DUD is intuitively dened.14 Formally, note that dierent correlated strategies may
be used to decide whether or not dierent disobedient deviation plans are detectable.
13Undetectability may be dened equivalently by Pr(a) = Pr(a;i) for all a 2 A by linearity.
14For a slightly stronger but also mathematically more tractable version of DUD (without using
reporting strategies), see Lemma B.1.
10This is one important aspect that renders DUD substantially weaker than other
conditions in the literature, as will soon be seen. To illustrate, consider an example.
Example 1. There are two publicly veriable signals, S = S0 = fx;yg, and two
players, I = f1;2g. Player 1 has two actions, A1 = fU;Dg, and player 2 has three
actions, A2 = fL;M;Rg. The conditional probability system Pr is given below.
L M R
U 1, 0 0, 1 1=2, 1=2
D 1, 0 0, 1 1=3, 2=3
If player 1 plays U then there is a mixed deviation by player 2 (namely 1
2[L]+ 1
2[M],
where [] stands for Dirac measure) such that the conditional probability over signals
equals what it would be if he played R. A similar phenomenon takes place when
player 1 plays D (this time with the deviation 2
3[L] + 1
3[M]) or indeed regardless of
player 1's mixed strategy. It is therefore impossible to even approximately enforce R
with transfers contingent only on signals if player 2 strictly prefers playing L and M,
since there always exists a protable deviation without any contractual losses.
However, Pr detects unilateral disobedience because for any deviation plan by player 2
there is a mixed strategy by player 1 that detects it. By correlating player 2's payment
with player 1's recommendation, secret contracts can keep player 2 from knowing the
proportion with which he ought to mix between L and M for his contractual payment
to equal what he would obtain by playing R. It will be seen that this renders R
enforceable. This suggests how secret contracts can extract more information from a
monitoring technology to provide incentives, even with publicly veriable signals.
Next, we will show that DUD characterizes approximate enforcement.
Denition 4 (PSI). A monitoring technology Pr provides strict incentives (PSI) if
there exists a probability weighted incentive scheme  : I  A  S ! R such that
8(i;ai;bi;i); 0 
X
(a i;s)
i(a;s)(Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja));
with a strict inequality whenever ai 6= bi.15
15Although no budget constraints are imposed, we could have added expected budget balance,
X
(i;a;s)
i(a;s) = 0;
but this constraint would not bind, since adding a constant to any  preserves its incentive properties.
11By scaling  as necessary, PSI implies that for every utility prole there is an incentive
scheme so that any deviator's contractual loss outweighs his deviation gain. PSI may
appear to be a rather strong condition, in contrast with the argued weakness of DUD
(Example 1). As it turns out, PSI and DUD are equivalent, in fact mutually dual.
Lemma 1. A monitoring technology detects unilateral disobedience if and only if it
provides strict incentives.
Proof. By the Alternative Theorem (Rockafellar, 1970), PSI fails if and only if there
is a vector   0 such that i(ai;bi;i) > 0 for some (i;ai;bi;i) with ai 6= bi and
8(a;s);
X
(bi;i)
i(ai;bi;i)(Pr(sja)   Pr(sja i;bi;i)) = 0:
Such a vector  exists if and only if the deviation plan i, dened pointwise by
i(bi;ijai) :=
(
i(ai;bi;i)=
P
(b0
i;0
i) i(ai;b0
i;0
i) if
P
(b0
i;0
i) i(ai;b0
i;0
i) > 0; and
[(ai;i)](bi;i) otherwise (where [] denotes Dirac measure),
is disobedient and undetectable: DUD fails. 
The simple proof of Lemma 1 above describes a duality between identiability and
enforceability via secret contracts. A natural corollary follows that motivates DUD
from a \backward-engineering" exercise: what minimal requirement on a monitoring
technology suces to contractually overcome incentive constraints? Given  and any
completely mixed correlated strategy  2 0(A) := f 2 (A) : 8a 2 A;(a) > 0g,
there exists  with i(a;s) = (a)i(a;s) for all (i;a;s). Hence, PSI is equivalent to
every  2 0(A) being (exactly) enforceable, which proves the next result.
Theorem 1. A monitoring technology detects unilateral disobedience if and only if
any team with any prole of utility functions can approximately enforce any correlated
strategy with secret contracts.
As Example 1 shows, DUD is not enough to provide incentives with just signal-
contingent contracts, but the following strengthening is. Given a subset B  A and
a player i, let Bi := fbi 2 Ai : 9b i 2 A i s.t. b 2 Bg be the projection of B on Ai.
Call a deviation plan i B-disobedient if it is disobedient at some ai 2 Bi. Given
 2 (A), say Pr detects unilateral disobedience at  (DUD-) if Pr() 6= Pr(;i)
for every player i and supp -disobedient16 deviation plan i. Intuitively, the same
 detects every i. The proof of Theorem 1 also implies the following corollary.
16By denition, supp  = fa 2 A : (a) > 0g is the support of .
12Corollary 1. Fix a correlated strategy . A monitoring technology detects unilateral
disobedience at  if and only if any team with any prole of utility functions can
enforce  with just \standard" signal-contingent contracts.
Corollary 1 captures the value-added of secret contracts. By the paragraph preceding
Theorem 1, DUD suces to enforce any completely mixed  with secret transfers by
eectively allowing the use of dierent 's to detect dierent 's, unlike standard
contracts, for which the same  must detect every .17 On the other hand, to enforce
a pure-strategy prole a, DUD is generally not enough. Since players receive only
one recommendation under [a], there is no use for secret contracts, so by Corollary 1
DUD-[a] characterizes enforcement with secret as well as standard contracts.
The intermediate case where  has arbitrary support is discussed in Section 4.1.
There, necessary and sucient conditions are derived for exact as well as approximate
enforcement. Section 4.2 extends the results further by xing utility functions.
Genericity of DUD is established next from the number of players' action-signal pairs.
Intuitively, incentives may be provided to a given player in three ways: (a) using only
others' signals to detect his deviations (e.g., Friday), (b) using only his own reports
and others' recommendations (e.g., Robinson), and (c) using both his reports and
others' signals in conjunction. Theorem 2 below identies conditions such that for
every player, at least one such way of detecting deviations is generic.
Theorem 2. DUD is generic if for every player i,
(a) jAij   1  jA ij(jS ij   1) when jSij = 1,
(b) jAij(jSij   1)  jA ij   1 when jS ij = 1, and
(c) jAijjSij  jA ijjS ij when both jSij > 1 and jS ij > 1.
If jSj = 1 then DUD is generic only if jAj = 1. More interestingly, DUD is generic
even if jSj = 2, as long as players have enough actions. Hence, a team may overcome
incentive constraints (i.e., DUD, therefore Theorem 1, holds) generically even if only
one individual can make substantive observations and these observations are just a
binary bit of information. If others' action spaces are large enough and their actions
have generic eect on the bit's probability, this uniquely informed individual may still
be controlled by testing him with unpredictable combinations of others' actions.18
17Even for approximate enforcement with standard contracts the same  must detect all 's. E.g.,
in Example 1 there is no sequence fmg with m ! [(U;R)] and Pr satisfying DUD-m for all m.
18We thank an anonymous referee for urging us to emphasize this point.
13We conclude this subsection by relating DUD to the literature. Broadly, DUD is an
improvement in that dierent  can be used to detect dierent i.
In a restricted setting, Legros and Matsushima (1991) and Legros and Matthews
(1993) nd conditions equivalent to DUD-[a] (but dierently interpreted) to enforce a
prole a with signal-contingent contracts. In repeated games, Fudenberg et al. (1994)
introduced individual full rank (IFR). Formally, IFR (at some ) means that for every
i, Pr() = 2 spanfPr(;bi;i) : (bi;i) 6= (ai;i)g, where \span" stands for linear span.
Arguably, the spirit of IFR is to detect deviations away from some prescribed , i.e.,
DUD-.19 IFR at  implies DUD- but not conversely.20 DUD is also weaker than
local IFR (LIFR) of d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1998), requiring IFR at possibly
dierent  for dierent i.21 Indeed, clearly LIFR implies DUD, and LIFR fails but
DUD holds in Example 1. \Local" DUD- fails there, too.
DUD is also weaker than the generalization of IFR by Kandori (2003), where players
play mixed strategies and report on the realization of such mixtures. He considers
contracts contingent on those reports and signal realizations. The next example shows
that secret contracts perform strictly better in non-pathological environments.
Example 2. Two players, two actions for each player, and two signals that only
player 1 can observe, with the monitoring technology below.
L R
U 1, 0 0, 1
D 0, 1 1, 0
Clearly, DUD holds, so by Theorem 1 every correlated strategy is approximately
enforceable. However, this result fails with Kandori's contracts. Indeed, suppose
that U dominates D for player 1 (the row player). Player 1's transfers cannot depend
on his report of his own action, since otherwise he would misreport, so at most they
can depend on player 1's report of the signal and player 2's action report. But player 1
always knows what player 2 played regardless of whether he chose U or D. Therefore,
player 1 can guarantee himself the same monetary payment independently of his
actual behavior. Hence, player 1 will never play D when facing Kandori's contracts.
19For instance, see Compte (1998) or Kandori and Matsushima (1998).
20If jS ij < jAij for some i then this holds trivially, since IFR is impossible yet DUD-, which
requires only convex (rather than linear) independence, is possible (e.g., all the points on a circle
are convexly independent). This holds even with at least as many signals as actions (e.g., consider
the vectors (1
3; 1
3;0; 1
3), (0; 1
3; 1
3; 1
3), (1
6;0; 1
3; 1
2) and (1
3;0; 1
6; 1
2)).
21For all i, LIFR uses the same correlated strategy i to detect each deviation plan i of player i.
14Tomala (2005) independently derives a condition comparable to DUD to prove a folk
theorem. He provides a condition denes detection with respect to a xed correlated
strategy using unconditional probabilities over actions and signals. He focuses on
exact implementation, so for  2 0(A), his version of DUD agrees broadly with ours
(he proves a version of Corollary 5 below). However, he does not study approximate
enforcement in general (i.e., for  = 2 0(A)), and does not use dierent  to detect
dierent i. This issue is developed further in Theorems 6 and 8 (Section 4) below.
Finally, DUD is also generically weaker than the conditions cited above, i.e., it holds
generically in a lower-dimensional space (see also Theorem 5 below).
3.2 Attribution
Let us now extend this analysis to teams with transfers subject to budget balance.
Denition 5 (Attribution). A deviation plan i for player i is unattributable if
there exists a prole  i = (1;:::;i 1;i+1;:::;n) of deviation plans such that
8 2 (A); Pr(;1) =  = Pr(;i) =  = Pr(;n):
Call i attributable if it is not unattributable, i.e., for every prole  i of deviation
plans, there is a correlated strategy  and a player j such that Pr(;i) 6= Pr(;j).
Intuitively, a deviation plan is unattributable if there exists a prole of opponents'
deviation plans such that every unilateral deviation would lead to the same expected
report probabilities. Heuristically, after an unattributable unilateral deviation, even
if the fact that someone deviated is detected, anyone could have been the culprit.
Denition 6 (IOP). A monitoring technology Pr identies obedient players (IOP)
if every disobedient deviation plan is attributable.
IOP is a stronger requirement on a monitoring technology than DUD. Indeed, DUD
follows by replacing  i above with honesty and obedience. IOP means that any
prole of disobedient deviation plans that aects the probability of reported signals
must do so in a way that diers across players. An immediate example of IOP is
a team with DUD and Holmstr om's (1982) principal. With no actions to take or
signals to observe (both Ai and Si are singletons), the principal is automatically
obedient. Hence, any detectable deviation can be discouraged with budget balance
by rewarding him and punishing everyone else.
15IOP isolates this idea and nds when the principal's role can be fullled internally.
Theorem 3 below shows that IOP characterizes approximate enforcement with budget
balance. To illustrate, recall the secret principal of Section 2.2, where if a worker
shirks then good news becomes less likely, whereas if the secret principal works then
good news becomes more likely. IOP holds by using dierent principals for dierent
workers. By Theorem 3, everything is approximately enforceable with budget balance.
Lemma 2. A monitoring technology identies obedient players if and only if it pro-
vides strict incentives with budget balance, i.e., there exists a probability weighted
incentive scheme  : I  A  S ! R such that
P
i i(a;s) = 0 for every (a;s), and
8(i;ai;bi;i); 0 
X
(a i;s)
i(a;s)(Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja));
with a strict inequality whenever ai 6= bi.
Proof. By the Alternative Theorem, PSI with budget balance fails if and only if   0
and  2 RAS exist with i(ai;bi;i) > 0 for some (i;ai;bi;i) with ai 6= bi and
8(i;a;s);
X
(bi;i)
i(ai;bi;i)(Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja)) = (a;s);
where  is independent of i. Let  = max(i;ai)
P
(bi;i) i(ai;bi;i) > 0. Dene
i(bi;ijai) :=
(
i(ai;bi;i)= if (bi;i) 6= (ai;i); and
1  
P
(bi;i)6=(ai;i) i(ai;bi;i)= otherwise.
By construction, i is disobedient and unattributable (using  i): IOP fails. 
We now restrict Theorem 1 with budget balance. The proof is identical, so omitted.
Theorem 3. A monitoring technology identies obedient players if and only if any
team with any prole of utility functions can approximately enforce any correlated
strategy with budget balanced secret contracts.
Enforcement with budget-balanced standard contracts is captured by strengthening
IOP as follows. Given  2 (A), say Pr identies obedient players at  (IOP-) if for
every supp -disobedient deviation plan i there is a prole of deviation plans  i
such that Pr(;i) 6= Pr(;j) for some player j. Intuitively, the same  attributes
every i. The next result follows easily from Theorem 3; its proof is omitted.
16Corollary 2. Fix a correlated strategy . A monitoring technology identies obedient
players at  if and only if any team with any prole of utility functions can enforce
 with signal-contingent budget-balanced contracts.
Corollary 2 shows that secret contracts add value by allowing the use of dierent 
to attribute dierent i. The next example illustrates this point.
Example 3. Consider a variation on Robinson and Friday (Section 2.1) with publicly
veriable signals (S = S0 = fg;bg) and slightly dierent signal probabilities:
work shirk work shirk
monitor 2; 1  1;0 monitor p;1   p q;1   q
rest 3; 1 0;0 rest 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2
Utility Payos Signal Probabilities
The prole (rest,work) is approximately enforceable with budget-balanced standard
contracts if and only if q 6= p = 1
2.22 On the other hand, (rest,work) is approximately
enforceable with budget-balanced secret contracts if and only if both p 6= q and
(p   1
2)(q   1
2)  0,23 which is much weaker, and equivalent to IOP.24
22Without loss, players mix independently. Robinson must be indierent between monitoring and
resting, so (1
2  p (1 )q) = 1, where  is the probability that Friday works,  = (g) (b)
and (!) is Robinson's payment to Friday if the signal is ! 2 fg;bg. Friday will shirk unless
(p   q) = 1 if 0 <  < 1, where  is the probability that Robinson monitors. (If  = 1 then
either p = 1
2 and Robinson's constraint fails, or p 6= 1
2 and  = 1=(1
2   p), so (p   q) ! 0 as
 ! 0 and Friday's constraint fails.) Therefore, p 6= q, and incentive compatibility holds as  ! 1
and  ! 0 only if p + (1   )q ! 1
2, i.e., p = 1
2. The converse is easy.
23The contracts of Footnote 22 suce if p = 1
2. Otherwise (so standard contracts fail), write
 or 0 for the dierence across signals in Robinson's payments to Friday if (monitor,work) or
(monitor,shirk) was recommended, respectively. All other payments equal 0 (so rest is incentive
compatible). Let  > 0 and  > 0 mean the same as in Footnote 22. If q > p > 1
2, set  = 1.
Monitoring requires 1  (1
2   p); working requires 1  (p   q). Both inequalities hold if
  0 is large. If p > q  1
2, let  < 1. For Friday to obey we need 1  (p   q) and
 1  (q p)0, and for Robinson to monitor 1  (1
2  p)+(1 )(1
2  q)0. All inequalities
hold for large 0  0  . The case p;q  1
2 follows by symmetry; the converse is easy.
24Let  and  be the probability that Robinson monitors if asked to rest and vice versa;  and 
that with which Friday works if asked to shirk and vice versa, respectively. Restricting attention to
g only, players change probabilities as follows:
Robinson work shirk Friday work shirk
monitor (1
2   p) (1
2   q) monitor (q   p) (p   q)
rest (p   1
2) (q   1
2) rest 0 0
Clearly, LHS 6= RHS for all non-zero (;;;)  0 if and only if p 6= q and (p   1
2)(q   1
2)  0.
17To better understand IOP, let us temporarily restrict attention to publicly veriable
monitoring technologies, where IOP can be decomposed into DUD together with
\
i2I
Ci = f0g;
where 0 stands for the origin of RAS and for every i, Ci (called the cone of player i)
is the set of all vectors  2 RAS such that for some deviation plan i : Ai ! (Ai),
8(a;s); (a;s) =
X
bi2Ai
i(bijai)(Pr(sja i;bi)   Pr(sja)):
Call this condition on fCi : i 2 Ig non-overlapping cones (NOC).25 NOC means that
every detectable deviation plan is attributable. Upon a detectable unilateral devia-
tion, it may be impossible to precisely identify deviator's identity, but by NOC there
must be someone to who could not have generated the statistical change. Budget-
balanced incentives are provided by rewarding the obedient and punishing all others.
Decomposing IOP into DUD and NOC facilitates comparison with related literature.
Fudenberg et al. (1994) impose pairwise full rank (PFR), implying that for every pair
of players, their cones do not overlap. Therefore, upon any deviation it is possible to
exactly identify the deviator's identity. On the other hand, NOC only requires that
all players' cones fail to overlap simultaneously. Thus, it is possible that two players'
cones overlap, i.e., their intersection is larger than just the origin, and violate PFR but
still provide incentives with budget balance. In general, NOC does not even require
that there always be two players whose cones fail to overlap, in contrast with local
compatibility of d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1998), as Figure 1 below illustrates.
Figure 1: A cross-section of three non-overlapping cones in R3 (pointed at the origin
behind the page) such that every pair of cones overlaps.
25To see that IOP is equivalent to DUD plus NOC, notice rstly that IOP clearly implies DUD.
By IOP, if a deviation plan i is unattributable then it is obedient, hence undetectable, and NOC
follows. Conversely, NOC implies that every unattributable i is undetectable. By DUD every
undetectable i is obedient. Hence, every unattributable i is obedient and IOP follows.
18NOC can be translated to an equivalent condition with dual economic interpretation
that provides useful insights into the contractual role played by NOC, as shown next.
Denition 7. A veriable monitoring technology Pr clears every budget (CEB) if
given K : A  S ! R there exists  : I  A  S ! R such that
8(a;s);
X
i2I
i(a;s) = K(a;s); and
8(i;ai;bi); 0 
X
(a i;s)
i(a;s)(Pr(sjbi;a i)   Pr(sja)):
The function K(a;s) may be regarded as a budgetary surplus or decit for each
combination of recommended action and realized signal. Intuitively, CEB means
that any budget can be attained by some payment scheme that avoids disrupting any
incentive compatibility constraints. As it turns out, this is equivalent to NOC.
Corollary 3. A publicly veriable monitoring technology has non-overlapping cones
if and only if it clears every budget.
This result helps clarify the role of DUD and NOC in Theorem 3. By Theorem 1,
DUD characterizes approximate enforcement of any correlated strategy . However,
the team's budget may not be balanced ex post. NOC guarantees the existence of
a further contract to absorb any budgetary decit or surplus of the original contract
without violating any incentive constraints. Therefore, the original contract plus this
further contract can now approximately enforce  with ex post budget balance.26
Without veriability, a decomposition of IOP into two separate parts does not emerge
naturally. Indeed, it is not dicult to see that NOC plus DUD is sucient but not
necessary for IOP. Necessity fails in general because there may exist dishonest but
otherwise obedient deviations that do not directly aect anyone's utility, and as such
IOP allows them to remain unattributable even if detectable. With veriability, every
deviation may in principle aect players directly. To illustrate, consider an example.
Example 4. Take a team with three players such that Ai is a singleton for every
player i, so IOP is automatically satised. There are no public signals and each player
observes a binary private signal: Si = f0;1g for all i. The monitoring technology is
Pr(s) :=
8
> <
> :
6
25 if
P
si = 3
3
25 if
P
si = 1 or 2
1
25 if
P
si = 0
26A similar argument is provided by d'Aspremont et al. (2004) for Bayesian mechanisms.
19The following is a prole of (trivially obedient) unattributable deviation plans that
are also detectable, violating NOC. Suppose that player i deviates by lying with
probability 2/5 after observing si = 1 and lying with probability 3/5 after observing
si = 0. For every player i, the joint distribution of reported private signals becomes:
Pr(s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
27
125 if
P
si = 3
18
125 if
P
si = 2
12
125 if
P
si = 1
8
125 if
P
si = 0
Genericity of IOP is discussed next. To motivate, consider the following example.
Example 5. Change Example 3 such that only Robinson observes the signal. Now
it is impossible to approximately enforce (rest,work) with budget balance.27
Hence, IOP fails. Unfortunately, it gets worse: the example is not pathological.
Theorem 4. Identifying obedient players is impossible with only two players and no
public information.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary action prole b a 2 A and consider the following disobedient
deviation plan i for every player i: always play b ai regardless of the mediator's
recommendation ai and report si with probability Pr(sijai;b a i) =
P
s i Pr(sjai;b a i)
independently of the actual signal realization. If any player i unilaterally deviates
according to i, the probability of reported signals becomes
Pr(sja;i) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
Pr(s1jb a)Pr(s2jb a) if a1 = b a1 and a2 = b a2
Pr(s1jb a)Pr(s2jb a1;a2) if a1 = b a1 and a2 6= b a2
Pr(s1ja1;b a2)Pr(s2jb a) if a1 6= b a1 and a2 = b a2
Pr(s1ja1;b a2)Pr(s2jb a1;a2) if a1 6= b a1 and a2 6= b a2
These probabilities are the same regardless of who deviates, hence IOP fails. 
Theorem 4 simply says that with two players and no public signals it is always
possible to blame the other player for a deviation. Since it is impossible to identify
who deviated, by elimination it is also impossible to identify who did not deviate.
27Just as in Footnote 24, for Friday to work we require that 1  (p   q). For Robinson to
monitor, we require that Friday mixes between working and shirking, so 0 <  < 1. Robinson's
incentive constraints when asked to monitor so that he exerts the eort and reports truthfully are
1  (  p) +(1  )(  q)0 for every  2 [0;1]. Here  represents Robinson's ability to lie
after resting. Choosing  = q yields 1  (q   p), but this is inconsistent with 1  (p   q).
20Fortunately, IOP is almost always satised beyond this restricted environment, as
the next result shows. Reorder the set I of players so that i < j if jSij  jSjj. Let
K = f1;2;:::;kg be the subset of players with jSij = 1, i.e., those who do not observe
a private signal. Finally, reorder K if necessary so that i < j if jAij  jAjj.
Theorem 5. IOP is generic if the conditions for Theorem 2 are satised and
n X
i=1
(jAijjSij)
2  1 n(jAnj
2 jSnj 1)  (n 1)jAjjSj (k  1)jAj+jAkj
k 1 X
i=1
jAij;
where n = 1 if jS nj = 1 and 0 otherwise, and players are ordered as above.
It is not dicult to see that if player 1 is a principal, i.e., jA1jjS1j = 1, then IOP is
generic if and only if DUD is generic. Intuitively, Theorem 5 holds when actions and
signals are allocated relatively evenly across players. This condition is weaker than
others in the literature. To help understand the result, consider some examples.
Example 6. If every player has the same number of actions, so jAij = m for all i,
and all available signals are publicly veriable information, so jSj = jS0j = `, then
IOP is generic when nm2  1  (n 1)`mn  (n 1)mn +(n 1)m2, or equivalently,
m2   1  (n   1)(`   1)mn, which holds for all `;n > 1 and m  1. Hence, IOP is
generic even with just two players and two public signals. Now suppose instead that
jSj = jSnj = ` > 1, so only player n observes the signals. By Theorem 2, DUD is
generic if m(`   1)  mn 1   1, which holds for all m > 1 if ` = 2 < n. The second
condition for IOP simplies to m2`2  mn((`   1)(n   1) + 1), which also holds for
all m > 1 if ` = 2 < n. Therefore, IOP is generic even if only one player observes a
binary private signal as long as there are at least three players.
We end this section with a discussion of some literature related to IOP. Broadly, IOP
improves on previous results by (i) using dierent strategies to detect/attribute dif-
ferent deviations and (ii) not requiring a deviator's identity. Specically, the relevant
literature is divided into contract theory, mechanism design and repeated games.
In contract theory, Legros and Matsushima (1991) characterize exact enforcement
with budget-balanced standard contracts and veriable signals, but their condition
is dicult to interpret, and one in terms of attribution is not suggested. Legros
and Matthews (1993) study approximate enforcement with standard budget-balanced
contracts and deterministic output, but fail to provide necessary conditions, and
again do not discuss attribution or rewarding the innocent. Finally, d'Aspremont
21and G erard-Varet (1998) nd stronger conditions (Figure 1) in a more restricted
setting, using linear methods. IOP subsumes these contributions in a more general
environment. IOP is also generic in a lower-dimensional space.
In mechanism design, d'Aspremont et al. (2004) provided necessary and sucient con-
ditions for budget-balanced implementation. Some of the results here have a similar
avor, such as Corollary 3. Independently from this paper, Kosenok and Severinov
(forthcoming) extend d'Aspremont et al. (2004) to include individual rationality, and
propose a condition they call weak identiability (WI) in the context of mechanism
design. Intuitively, WI implies that no prole of unilateral deviations (from truthful
reporting strategies) can change the distribution of reports in the same way.
There are important dierences between their work and ours, partly due to the dier-
ence between moral hazard and adverse selection. Firstly, we consider outcomes that
are not necessarily pure-strategy proles. This permits the use of dierent outcomes
to attribute dierent deviations, unlike the mechanism design literature, which just
enforces honest reporting. For IOP to fail, there must be a disobedient deviation
that is unattributable across all recommended action proles, so IOP can be satised
even if WI is violated at a given action prole. Secondly, this paper studies both
exact and approximate enforcement, whereas the mechanism design literature only
considers exact enforcement. Thirdly, WI requires attribution with respect to every
deviation, in contrast to IOP, which requires attribution only with respect to dis-
obedient ones. Therefore, since players' signals are not necessarily veriable in this
paper, IOP is not generally bound by the decomposition of Corollary 3, unlike the
mechanism design literature. Finally, the \types" in this paper are endogenous.
As for repeated games, IOP was compared to PFR just before Figure 1, so IOP
subsumes Fudenberg et al. (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Kandori (2003)
and Kandori and Obara (2006). Independently, Aoyagi (2005) and Tomala (2005)
use stronger conditions than IOP to prove a folk theorem for repeated games with
private monitoring and mediated communication. Aoyagi's dynamic strategies rely
on \"-perfect" monitoring, and fail if monitoring is costly, one-sided, or public, for
instance. Tomala considers a class of recursive equilibria that render his problem
similar to ours by interpreting patient players' continuation payos as linear transfers.
His folk theorem requires budget balance for every weighted sum of transfers, which
makes his condition much stronger, comparable to PFR. In addition, he assumes that
every deviation is attributable, whereas IOP only attributes disobedient ones.
224 Discussion
This section makes four comments. Firstly, the previous section's results are extended
to correlated strategies with restricted support. Secondly, these results are further
extended by restricting attention to a xed prole of utility functions. Thirdly, we
comment on individual rationality and limited liability. Finally, we discuss collusion
and characterize contracts that dissuade multilateral deviations.
4.1 Exact versus Approximate Enforcement
Next, we characterize exact enforcement of a xed correlated strategy for any utility
prole. Fix two sets of action proles B;C  A. A deviation plan i is C-detectable
if Pr() 6= Pr(;i) for some  2 (A) with supp   C. Say Pr C-detects unilateral
B-disobedience (DUDC
B) if every B-disobedient deviation plan is C-detectable. (We
will call A-detection simply detection, and write DUDA
B as DUDB.) For instance,
DUDA
A is just DUD, and DUD
fag
fag equals DUD-[a]. Consider another example.
Example 7. There are two players and two publicly veriable signals, with the
monitoring technology below. (It is Example 1 with an added row.)
L M0 R
U 1, 0 0, 1 2=3, 1=3
M 1, 0 0, 1 1=2, 1=2
D 1, 0 0, 1 1=3, 2=3
Let A = fU;M;DgfL;M0;Rg, B = fU;MgfL;M0;Rg, C = fU;DgfL;M0;Rg.
Clearly, DUDA
A fails here, since 1
2[U] + 1
2[D] is statistically indistinguishable from
M. Also, DUDA
B fails because a plan to play 1
2[U] + 1
2[D] when asked to play M
is A-undetectable and B-disobedient. However, DUDC
C does hold, since there is no
undetectable deviation from D or U by the row player. (DUD- fails for every .)
Corollary 4. Fix any subset B  A. A monitoring technology B-detects unilateral
B-disobedience if and only if any team with any prole of utility functions can enforce
every (if and only if some) correlated strategy with support B using secret contracts.
Therefore, every correlated strategy with support equal to a subset of B is automat-
ically approximately enforceable, just as with Theorem 1. By Corollary 4, only the
support of a correlated strategy matters for its enforcement regardless of preferences.
23Having characterized exact enforcement, we proceed with approximate enforcement.
By Corollary 4, existence of some C  B such that DUDC
C holds clearly yields a
sucient condition. However, this is unnecessary. To motivate, consider an example.
Example 8. Two players, two public signals, the following monitoring technology:
L M R
U 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0
D 1, 0 0, 1 0, 1
The action prole (U;L) is not enforceable for every utility prole, since DUD
f(U;L)g
f(U;L)g
clearly fails. Indeed, playing D when asked to play U is f(U;L)g-undetectable. It
is also easy to see that DUDC
C fails, too, for every C  f(U;L)g. However, (U;L) is
approximately enforceable for every utility prole, since either [(D;M)] or [(D;R)]
can be used to detect f(U;L)g-disobedient deviations. No contract can induce the row
player to choose M if R is strictly dominant, say, but this is unimportant as long as
the row player chooses either M or R when asked to do so. The key condition satised
here is that every f(U;L)g-disobedient deviation plan is detectable (DUDf(U;L)g).
In general, it should be clear that DUDB is necessary for approximate enforcement,
but perhaps it is not so clear that it is also sucient, as the next result shows.
Theorem 6. Fix any subset B  A. A monitoring technology detects unilateral
B-disobedience if and only if any team with any prole of utility functions can ap-
proximately enforce every correlated strategy with support in B using secret contracts.
Clearly, Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 6 (as well as Corollary 4) when
B = A. Example 8 illustrates the insight behind Theorem 6 and gives intuition for
its proof. Suppose that, to detect deviations from ai 2 Bi, some aj = 2 Bj is played
infrequently by j 6= i. What if aj itself has a protable, undetectable deviation
j(aj) 2 (Aj)? After all, DUDB says nothing about detection outside B. If such
j(aj) exists, playing it instead of aj still detects deviations from ai by virtue of being
undetectable. Similarly, undetectable deviations from j(aj) detect deviations from
ai, and so on. Proceeding iteratively, since the game is nite there must be detecting
behavior without a protable, undetectable deviation.
We end this subsection by remarking that Corollary 4 and Theorem 6 generalize
easily with appropriate versions of IOP after detection is replaced with attribution.
244.2 Fixed Utility Functions
Throughout this section, let us x a prole v : I  A ! R of utility functions. A
natural weakening of the previous results might be to allow for undetectable deviation
plans as long as they are unprotable. Exact enforcement amounts to the following.
Corollary 5. A correlated strategy  is enforceable with secret contracts if and only
if every supp -undetectable deviation plan i of any player i is -unprotable, i.e.,
vi(;i) :=
X
(a;bi;i)
(a)i(bi;ijai)(vi(a i;bi)   vi(a))  0:
The proof of this claim is comparable to previous ones, therefore omitted. Given an
enforceable correlated strategy , we now ask how large transfers must be to enforce
it. To this end, let us introduce some notation. Let Di = (Ai  Ri)Ai be the space
of deviation plans i for a player i and D =
Q
i Di be the set of proles of deviation
plans  = (1;:::;n). For any deviation plan i 2 Di and any  2 (A), write
kPr(;i)k :=
X
s2S
  
X
(a;bi;i)
(a)(i(bi;ijai)Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja))
 
:
This norm summarizes the dierence in signal probabilities between abiding by 
and deviating to i. A correlated strategy  is called enforceable within some vector
z 2 RI
+ if there exists a scheme  : I  A  S ! R to satisfy () and
8(i;a;s);  (a)zi  i(a;s)  (a)zi:
Next, we provide a lower bound on z so that  is enforceable within z.
Theorem 7. (i) A correlated strategy  is enforceable within z 2 RI
+ if and only if
V(z) := max
2D
X
i2I
vi(;i)  
X
(i;a)
zi(a)kPr(a;i)k = 0:
(ii) If  is enforceable then V(z) = 0 for some z 2 RI
+. If not then supz V(z) > 0.
(iii) A correlated strategy  is enforceable if and only if zi < +1 for every i, where
zi := sup
i2Fi
maxfvi(;i);0g
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k
if Fi := fi :
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k > 0g 6= ;
and, whenever Fi = ;, zi := +1 exactly when maxi vi(;i) > 0.28
(iv) If zi < +1 for every i then V(z) = 0 if and only if zi  zi for all i.
28Intuitively, Fi is the set of all supp -detectable deviation plans available to player i.
25Theorem 7 quanties the wedge that transfers require to enforce a given correlated
strategy with punishments and rewards. It implies that supp -detectability, hence
also enforceability by Corollary 5, is captured by
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k > 0. By
Corollary 1, enforcement with signal-contingent transfers is captured by the stronger
detectability condition that 0 < kPr(;i)k 
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k. Hence, a
version of Theorem 7 holds with signal-contingent transfers and kPr(;i)k instead
of
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k. Finally, Theorem 7 (iii) clearly implies the following.
Corollary 6. Each supp -undetectable deviation plan is -unprotable if and only
if there exists z  0 such that vi(;i)  z
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k for all i and i,
that is, utility gains from any deviation are uniformly outweighed by monetary losses.
Next, we characterize approximate enforcement of a correlated strategy for a xed
prole of utility functions. Corollary 5 might suggest that a correlated strategy 
is enforceable if every -protable deviation plan is detectable. However, the next
example shows that approximate enforcement imposes a stronger requirement.
Example 9. Consider a variation on Robinson and Friday (Section 2.1):
work shirk solitaire work shirk solitaire
monitor 0; 1 0;0 0;0 monitor 1;0 0;1 1;0
rest 0; 1 0;0 0; 1 rest 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2 1=2;1=2
Utility Payos Signal Probabilities
Assume for simplicity that the signal is publicly veriable and Robinson's utility
is constant. Clearly, the prole (rest,work) is not enforceable because a deviation
by Friday to shirk is [(rest,work)]-protable and f(rest,work)g-undetectable. More-
over, (rest,work) is not approximately enforceable either. Indeed, for Friday to ever
work Robinson must monitor with positive probability. But then no contract can
discourage Friday from playing solitaire instead of working, since playing solitaire
when asked to work is undetectable and weakly dominant. On the other hand, every
[(rest,work)]-protable deviation plan is detectable.
Removing solitaire from Example 9 restores approximate enforcement of (rest,work).
This occurs not because every (rest,work)-protable deviation is detectable (it is true
with or without solitaire), but because it is uniformly detectable, i.e., the utility gains
from every (rest,work)-protable deviation by Friday are uniformly outweighed by
monetary losses when Robinson monitors, in line with Corollary 6. The next result
characterizes approximate enforcement with \uniform, credible" detection.
26Theorem 8. A correlated strategy  is approximately enforceable if and only if there
exists z  0 such that every -protable deviation plan i is detectable by some
correlated strategy  for which both
(i) vi(;i) < z
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k and
(ii) vj(;j)  z
P
a (a)kPr(a;j)k for every other player j and deviation j.
Intuitively, Theorem 8 says that to approximately enforce a correlated strategy, it
is necessary and sucient that all its protable deviations be discouraged both (i)
uniformly and (ii) credibly. As before, dierent behavior may be used to detect
dierent deviations by a player.29 Formally, uniform detection means that for the
same xed z, every deviation plan i must impact the magnitude of z-weighted
probabilistic changes enough to outweigh its deviation gains. Therefore, transfers
bounded within z can provide incentives against all -protable deviations, perhaps
with dierent  for dierent i.
To explain the need for credibility, compare this result with Theorem 6, where \cred-
ible monitoring" is unnecessary. There, every disobedient deviation is potentially
protable, so ought to be detectable. Here, with xed utility functions, even if some
disobedient deviation plan i is undetectable, it may nonetheless be discouraged with
behavior  by others that makes the deviation unprotable (as in a correlated equi-
librium without transfers). However, if this specic behavior is not credible then
there may exist a -protable deviation plan j by some other player such that i
becomes protable once again given  and j.
We end this subsection by noting without proof that all previous results hold also with
budget balance using the same arguments, replacing detection with attribution and
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k with min
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)   (a)k, where  2 RAS.
Now, instead of the change in transfers to a player after a deviation being bounded
by the magnitude of the change in the probability over signals, it is bounded by the
residuals of a least-absolute-deviations regression of the probability changes on A.
This amount is clearly smaller than the magnitude of the dependent variable, i.e.,
the probability change. Intuitively, budget balance implies that only the variation
across players of the deviations' eect on signals can be used to provide incentives to
discourage them, rather than the deviations' eects themselves.
29To see that credibility matters, simply add a row to the table in Example 8 above with utility
payos  1; 1  1;0  1; 1 and signal probabilities 1;0 0;1 1;0 . Now there is an
action for Robinson that is strictly dominated and indistinguishable from monitoring, yet uniformly
detects all of Friday's (rest,work)-protable deviations.
274.3 Participation and Liability
Individual rationality is also amenable to our study of incentives, and captured by
the following family of linear inequalities:
8i 2 I;
X
a2A
(a)vi(a)  
X
(a;s)
i(a;s)Pr(sja)  0:
Without budget balance, since players can be paid lump sums to become indierent
between belonging to the team and forsaking it, individual rationality constraints do
not bind. Hence, suppose the team's budget must be balanced ex post.
Theorem 9. Consider a team subject to incentive compatibility and budget balance.
Participation is not a binding constraint if
P
i vi(a)  0 for all a.
This theorem generalizes standard results (e.g., d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet, 1998,
Lemma 1) to our setting. Next, we characterize enforcement subject to participation,
liability and budget constraints. The proof is similar to previous ones, hence omitted.
Theorem 10. The correlated strategy  is enforceable with budget balance and indi-
vidual rationality within z if and only if for every  2 D,  2 Rn
+ and  2 RAS,
X
i2I
vi(;i) 
X
i2I
ivi() +
X
(i;a)
zi(a)kPr(a;i)   (a)   i Pr(a)k:
To interpret Theorem 10, consider a group of players within which deviations are
internally unattributable. This result says that the deviations gains for players in the
group must be compensated by the liability of players outside the group. Indeed, let
 2 D be such that Pr(a;i) coincides for all a and i in some subset t ( I. Let
i =  for i 2 t and choose  so that kPr(a;i)   (a)    Pr(a)k = 0 for all a and
i 2 t. If zj = 0 for all j = 2 t then the above inequality fails if  is not a correlated
equilibrium. Hence, zj must be positive for some j = 2 t, i.e., the deviation gains from
 are compensated by the liability of players outside t.
Next, we study one-sided limited liability given z 2 RI
+, by considering constraints of
the form i(a;s)  (a)zi. A team's total liability is dened by b z =
P
i zi. Without
participation constraints, Theorem 5 of Legros and Matsushima (1991) and Theorem
4 of Legros and Matthews (1993) easily generalize to this setting.
Theorem 11. In the absence of participation constraints, only total (one-sided) lia-
bility aects a team's enforceable outcomes, not the distribution of liability.
28Including participation constraints leads to the following characterization.
Theorem 12. The correlated strategy  is enforceable with budget balance, individual
rationality and one-sided liability limited by z if and only if
X
i2I
vi(a;i) 
X
i2I
i(vi()   zi) + b 
X
i2I
zi
for every (;; b ) such that  is a prole of deviation plans,  = (1;:::;n)  0,
and b  :=
P
s maxifi Pr(sja)   Pr(sja;i)g.
A similar intuition as in Theorem 10 regarding liability applies here, too. If a subset
t of individuals can deviate indistinguishably then others must accept liability for it.
Theorem 10 also generalizes Theorems 9 and 11, as the next result shows.
Corollary 7. Suppose that  is enforceable with budget balance, individual rationality
and one-sided liability limited by z. (i) If vi()  zi then player i's participation is not
a binding constraint. (ii) The distribution of liability does not matter within the subset
t of players whose participation constraint is not binding, i.e.,  is also enforceable
with budget balance, individual rationality and one-sided liability limited by any z0
with zj = z0
j for j 2 I n t and
P
i2t zi =
P
i2t z0
i.
4.4 Coalitional Deviations
A notable weakness of secret contracts is not being collusion-proof. To illustrate, in
our leading example (Section 2.1) Robinson and Friday could communicate \extra-
contractually" to break down the incentives that secrets tried to provide.30 On the
other hand, collusion is a problem for contracts in general. For instance, the scheme
proposed by Cremer and McLean (1988) is not collusion-proof for similar reasons.
To study collusion-proof contracts, assumptions must be made regarding coalitions'
contractual ability. We will assume that every coalition t maximizes some given
coalitional utility function vt : A ! R, quasilinear in monetary transfers.31
30The following incentive scheme deters such communication between Robinson and Friday (Friday
prefers misreporting his signal to Robinson) while approximately enforcing (rest,work).
(monitor,work) (monitor,shirk) (rest,work) (rest,shirk)
g 1=;1= 0;1= 1=2;0 0;1=2(1   )
b 0;0 1=(1   );0 0;1=(1   ) 1=2(1   );1=2(1   )
31This assumption is standard. See for instance, Che and Kim (2006) and references therein. The
purpose of this section is not to derive a meaningful utility for coalitions, but to use one.
29Denition 8. A correlated strategy  is strongly enforceable if there is an incentive
scheme  : I  A  S ! R such that
8t  I;at 2 At;(bt;t) 2 At  Rt;
X
a t
(a)(vt(a t;bt)   vt(a)) 
X
(a t;s)
(a)
X
i2t
i(a;s)(Pr(sja t;bt;t)   Pr(sja)):
Strong enforcement requires that no subset of players can protably deviate after
coordinating their information even if they can commit to sharing their information
non-strategically. This makes strong enforceability especially \strong."
We now derive the detection requirement implied by strong enforceability. Given a
nonempty subset of players t  I, a multilateral deviation plan for t is any measure-
valued map t : At ! (At  Rt), where At  Rt =
Q
i2t Ai  Ri. Intuitively, a
multilateral deviation plan t has the players in t coordinate their deviations con-
tingent on all recommendations to members of t. A multilateral deviation plan t is
called disobedient if t(bt;tjat) > 0 for some (at;bt;t) such that at 6= bt. It is called
detectable if Pr() 6= Pr(;t) for some  2 (A).
A coalitional deviation plan by player i is a prole of multilateral deviation plans
i = ft : t 3 ig, one for each coalition to which i may belong. It is called disobedient
if t is disobedient for some coalition t 3 i. It is called detectable if Pr() 6= Pr(;i)
for some  2 (A), where Pr(;i) :=
P
t3i
P
(a;bt;t) (a)Pr(a t;bt;t)t(bt;tjat).
Intuitively, a coalitional deviation plan for a player i is a prole of multilateral devi-
ation plans involving i. It is undetectable if regardless of the correlated strategy ,
even if some multilateral deviation plan t is detectable, there is another multilateral
deviation plan t0 with i 2 t \ t0 that \undoes" the change in probability from t.
Therefore, even if every disobedient multilateral deviation plan is detectable, it is
possible that some disobedient coalitional deviation plan remains undetectable.
Denition 9 (DCD). A monitoring technology Pr detects coalitional disobedience
(DCD) if every disobedient coalitional deviation plan is detectable.
The next result characterizes strong enforcement as detection of coalitional deviations.
It is argued similarly to previous ones, so its proof is omitted.
Theorem 13. A monitoring technology detects coalitional disobedience if and only if
any team with any prole of coalitional utility functions can approximately strongly
enforce every correlated strategy with secret contracts.
305 Conclusion
Secret contracts emphasize that|as part of a team's economic organization|it may
be benecial for private information to be allocated dierently across individuals in
order for the right incentives to be provided. This remains true even if the team starts
without informational asymmetry. Secret contracts eectively subject contractual
deviations to \tailored monitoring," making monitors de facto auditors. Heuristically,
secret contracts allow for monitoring to follow deviations.
We have provided above arguably weak notions of detection to characterize contrac-
tual enforcement. With budget-balanced contracts, we have shown that the appro-
priate notion of detection is attribution, which may be crudely interpreted as saying
that \guilty until proven innocent" is|at least informationally|less costly than \in-
nocent until proven guilty" as a principle for incentive provision.
A Proofs
Corollary 1. Fix any  2 (A). By the Alternative Theorem, a monitoring technology Pr
satises DUD- if and only if there is a signal-contingent scheme  : I  S ! R such that
8i 2 I;ai 2 Bi;(bi;i) 2 Ai  Ri; 0 
X
(a i;s)
(a)i(s)(Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja));
with a strict inequality if ai 6= bi, where Bi = fai 2 Ai : 9a i s.t. (a) > 0g. Call this dual
condition PSI-. By scaling  appropriately, PSI- clearly implies that any deviation gains
can be outweighed by contractual losses. Conversely, if DUD- fails then Pr() = Pr(;i)
for some deviation plan i with i(bi;ijai) > 0 for some ai 2 Bi, and bi 6= ai. For
all a i, let 0 = vi(a) < vi(a i;bi) = 1. Now  cannot be enforced by any  : I  S ! R,
since
P
(bi;i) i(bi;ijai)
P
a i (a)(vi(a i;bi) vi(a)) >
P
s i(s)(Pr(sj;i) Pr(sj)) = 0,
being a convex combination of incentive constraints, must violate at least one. 
Theorem 2. By Lemma B.1, DUD is implied by conic independence
8(i;ai;si); Pr(ai;si) = 2 conefPr(bi;ti) : (bi;ti) 6= (ai;si)g:
This is in turn implied by linear independence, or full row rank, for all i, of the matrix with
jAijjSij rows, jA ijjS ij columns and entries Pr(ai;si)(a i;s i) = Pr(sja). Since the set of
full rank matrices is generic, this full row rank is generic if jAijjSij  jA ijjS ij if jSij > 1
31and jS ij > 1. If jSij = 1, adding with respect to s i for each a i yields column vectors
equal to (1;:::;1) 2 RAi. This leaves jA ij   1 linearly dependent columns. Eliminating
them, genericity requires that for every i,
jAij = jAijjSij  jA ijjS ij   (jA ij   1) = jA ij  (jS ij   1) + 1:
Similarly, there are jAij   1 redundant row vectors when jS ij = 1. Since the intersection
of nitely many generic sets is generic, DUD is generic if all these conditions hold. 
Corollary 3. Consider the following primal problem: Find a feasible  to solve
8(i;ai;bi); 0 
X
(a i;s)
i(a;s)(Pr(sja i;bi)   Pr(sja)); and 8(a;s);
X
i2I
i(a;s) = K(a;s):
The dual of this problem is given by
inf
0;
X
(a;s)
(a;s)K(a;s) s.t. 8(i;a;s);
X
bi2Ai
i(ai;bi)(Pr(sja i;bi)   Pr(sja)) = (a;s):
If CEB is satised, then the value of the primal equals 0 for any K : A  S ! R. By the
Strong Duality Theorem, the value of the dual is also 0 for any K : AS ! R. Therefore,
any  satisfying the constraint for some  must be 0 for all (a;s), so NOC is satised.
For necessity, if NOC is satised then the value of the dual is always 0 for any K : AS ! R.
By strong duality, the value of the primal is also 0 for any K. Therefore, given K, there is
a feasible primal solution i(a;s) that satises all primal constraints, and CEB holds. 
Theorem 5. Given the ordering of players in the main text, if k > 0 permute player k with
player 1 and consider the following block matrix (blank spaces denote blocks of zeros).
Q =
2
6 6
6 6
6 6
4
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1
 Q2
 Q3
  Qn 1
 Qn
3
7 7
7
7 7
7
5
where Qi is the matrix with (jAijjSij)2 rows and jAjjSj columns dened pointwise by
Qi(ai;si;bi;ti)(b a;b s) =
(
Pr(b s i;tijb a i;bi) if (ai;si) = (b ai;b si)
0 otherwise.
By Lemma B.2, IOP is satised if
Q = 0 and   0 ) i(ai;si;bi;ti) = 0 whenever ai 6= bi;
32which in turn is implied by Q having full row rank.
Note that one row of Q is redundant because for every player i > 1,
8(b a;b s);
X
(a1;s1)
Q1(a1;s1;a1;s1)(b a;b s) =
X
(ai;si)
Qi(ai;si;ai;si)(b a;b s):
There may also be redundant column vectors. If k > 1, x any player i  k with i > 1 and
any (a1;ai) 2 A1  Ai. Then, for any b a such that b a1 = a1 and b ai = ai,
8(b1;bi);
X
b s
Q1(a1;b1)(b a;b s) = 1 and
X
b s
Qi(ai;bi)(b a;b s) = 1:
Therefore there are jA 1;ij   1 redundant columns for each (a1;ai). If jS nj = 1 a similar
argument shows that there are (jAnjjSnj)2 jAnj   1 additional redundant rows.
Therefore, Q is generically full row rank if (1) the conditions for Theorem 2 are satised so
that generically every Qi has full row rank and (2) the number of (non-redundant) rows is
less than the number of (non-redundant) columns, i.e.,
n X
i=1
(jAijjSij)2   1   n(jAnj
2 jSnj   1)  (n   1)jAjjSj   jA1j
k 1 X
i=2
jAij(jA 1;ij   1)
 (n   1)jAjjSj   (k   1)jAj + jA1j
k 1 X
i=2
jAij;
where n = 1 if jS nj = 1 and 0 otherwise. This inequality completes the proof. 
Corollary 4. By the Alternative Theorem, Pr satises DUDB
B if and only if it satises
PSIB
B, i.e., there exists a scheme  : I  A  S ! R such that i(a;s) = 0 if a = 2 B and
8i 2 I;ai 2 Bi;bi 2 Ai;i 2 Ri; 0 
X
(a i;s)
i(a;s)(Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja));
with a strict inequality whenever ai 6= bi. Replacing i(a;s) = (a)i(a;s) for some (or
equivalently any) correlated strategy  with supp  = B, this is equivalent to there being,
for every prole of utility functions, an appropriate rescaling of  that satises (). 
Theorem 6. For necessity, if DUDB fails then there is a B-disobedient, undetectable de-
viation plan i. Therefore, i(bi;ijai) > 0 for some ai 2 Bi, bi 6= ai and i 2 Ri. Letting
vi(a i;bi) < vi(a) for every a i, clearly no correlated strategy with positive probability on
ai is approximately enforceable. Suciency follows by Lemmata B.3, B.4 and B.10. 
33Theorem 7. Consider the family of linear programs below indexed by z 2 [0;1)I.
max
"0;
 
X
(i;ai)
"i(ai) s.t. 8(i;a;s);  (a)zi  i(a;s)  (a)zi;
8(i;ai;bi;i);
X
a i
(a)vi(a;bi)  
X
a i
i(a)  Pr(a;bi;i)  "i(ai);
where vi(a;bi) := vi(a i;bi)   vi(a) and Pr(a;bi;i) := Pr(a i;bi;i)   Pr(a). Given
z  0, the primal problem above looks for a scheme  adapted to  (i.e., such that i(a;s) = 0
whenever (a) = 0) that minimizes the burden "i(ai) of relaxing incentive constraints. By
construction,  is enforceable with transfers bounded by z if and only if there is a feasible
 with "i(ai) = 0 for all (i;ai), i.e., the value of the problem is zero. Since  is assumed
enforceable, such z exists. The dual of this problem is:
min
;0
X
(i;a)
(a)[zi
X
s2S
(a)(+
i (a;s) +  
i (a;s))   vi(a;i)] s.t.
8(i;ai);
X
(bi;i)
i(bi;ijai)  1;
8i 2 I;a 2 supp ;s 2 S; Pr(sja;i) = +
i (a;s)    
i (a;s):
Since 
i (a;s)  0, it follows easily that +
i (a;s) = maxfPr(sja;i);0g and  
i (a;s) =
minfPr(sja;i);0g. Hence, +
i (a;s) + +
i (a;s) = jPr(sja;i)j. Since kPr(a;i)k =
P
s jPr(sja;i)j, the dual is now equivalent to
V(z) = max
0
X
(i;a)
(a)(vi(a;i)   z kPr(a;i)k) s.t. 8(i;ai);
X
(bi;i)
i(bi;ijai)  1:
Adding mass to i(ai;ijai) if necessary, without loss i is a deviation plan, proving (i).
To prove (ii), the rst sentence is obvious. The second follows by Corollary 5: if  is not
enforceable then a -protable, supp -undetectable plan i exists, so V(z) > 0 for all z.
For (iii), if  is not enforceable then there is a -protable, supp -undetectable deviation
plan 
i. Approaching 
i from Fi (e.g., with mixtures of 
i and a xed plan in Fi), the
denominator dening zi tends to zero whilst the numerator tends to a positive amount, so
zi is unbounded. Conversely, suppose  is enforceable. If the sup dening zi is attained, we
are done. If not, it is approximated by a sequence of supp -detectable deviation plans that
converge to a supp -undetectable one. Since  is enforceable, the limit is unprotable. Let
F
i () := min
i0
X
a2A
(a)kPr(a;i)k s.t. vi(;i)  :
Since every -protable deviation plan is detectable by Corollary 5, it follows that F
i () > 0
for all  > 0, and zi = (lim#0 F
i ()=) 1. Hence, it suces to show lim#0 F
i ()= > 0.
34To this end, by adding variables like  above, the dual problem for F
i is equivalent to:
F
i () = max
"0;xi
" s.t. 8(a;s);  1  xi(a;s)  1;
8(ai;bi;i);
X
a i
(a)("vi(a;bi)   xi(a)  Pr(a;bi;i))  0:
Since  is enforceable, there is a feasible solution to this dual (";xi) with " > 0. Hence,
F
i ()  " for all  > 0, therefore lim#0 F
i ()= > 0, as claimed.
To prove (iv), suppose that zi < 1 for all i. We claim V(z) = 0. Indeed, given 
i 2 Fi
for all i, substituting the denition of zi into the objective of the minimization in (i),
X
i2I
vi(;
i)  
X
(i;a)
(a) sup
i2Fi
f
maxfvi(;i);0g
P
a (a)kPr(a;i)k
gkPr(a;
i)k  0:
If 
i = 2 Fi then, since  is enforceable, every supp -undetectable deviation plan is unprof-
itable, so again the objective is non-positive, hence V(z) = 0. Clearly, V decreases with
z, so it remains to show that V(z) > 0 if zi < zi for some i. But by denition of z, there
is a deviation plan 
i with vi(;
i)=
P
a (a)kPr(a;
i)k > zi, so V(z) > 0. 
Theorem 8. For suciency, suppose that  is approximately enforceable, so there is a
sequence fmg such that m is enforceable for every m and m ! . Without loss, assume
that supp m  supp  for all m. If m =  for all large m then  is enforceable and
the condition of Theorem 8 is fullled with  = , so suppose not. If there exists m and
m0 such that m = pm0
+ (1   p) then incentive compatibility with respect to m yields
that
P
a i m(a)vi(a;i) 
P
a i m(a)m
i (a)  Pr(a;i) 
P
a i m(a)z kPr(a;i)k
for every i, where z = max(i;a;s) jm
i (a;s)j. For large m0, m0
is suciently close to  that
if i is -protable then
P
a i m0
(a)vi(a;i) > 0, so i is detectable.
If there does not exist m and m1 such that m = pm1 +(1 p) then there exists m2 such
that its distance from  is less than the positive minimum distance between  and the ane
hull of fm;m1g. Therefore, the lines generated by m and m1 and m1 and m2 are not
collinear. Proceeding inductively, pick C = fm1;:::;mjAjg such that its ane space is
full-dimensional in (A). Since we are assuming that  is not enforceable, it lies outside
conv C. Let b  =
P
k mk=jAj and B"(b ) be the open "-ball around b  for some " > 0. By
construction, B"(b )  conv C for " > 0 suciently small, so there exists b 0 2 B"(b ) such
that pb  + (1   p) = b 0 for some p such that 0 < p < 1. Now we can apply the argument
from the previous paragraph, so the condition of Theorem 8 holds.
For necessity, if  is not approximately enforceable then 1  V(z)  C > 0 for every z,
35where V is dened in Lemma B.3. Let (z;z) solve V(z) for every z. Given  2 (A),
C  V(z)  1 +
X
(i;a)
vi(;z
i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;z
i)k:
If the condition of Theorem 8 holds then
P
(i;a) vi(;z
i) < z
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;z
i)k and
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;z
i)k > 0, since there must exist i such that 
i is -protable. Hence,
C  1 + (z   z)
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;z
i)k, i.e., z   z  (1   c)=
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;z
i)k.
This inequality must hold for every z, therefore
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;z
i)k ! 0 as z ! 1.
But this contradicts Lemma B.11, since
P
i vi(;i)  C, completing the proof. 
Theorem 9. Enforcing an arbitrary correlated strategy  subject to budget balance and
participation reduces to nding transfers  to solve the following family of linear inequalities:
8(i;ai;bi;i); vi(;bi) 
X
a i
(a)i(a)  Pr(a;bi;i);
8(a;s);
n X
i=1
i(a;s) = 0;
8i 2 I;
X
a2A
(a)vi(a)  
X
(a;s)
(a)i(a;s)Pr(sja)  0:
The dual of this metering problem subject to participation is:
max
;0;
X
i2I
vi(;i)   ivi() s.t. 8(i;a;s); (a)Pr(sja;i) = (a;s) + i Pr(sja)
where i is a multiplier for player i's participation constraint and vi() =
P
a (a)vi(a).
Adding the dual constraints with respect to s 2 S, it follows that i =  does not depend
on i. Redening (a;s) as (a;s)+ Pr(sja), the set of feasible   0 is the same as without
participation constraints. Since
P
i vi(a)  0 for all a, the dual is maximized by  = 0. 
Theorem 11. We just prove the result with budget balance (without budget balance it fol-
lows similarly). Let z = (z1;:::;zn) be a vector of liability limits for each player. Enforcing
 subject to budget balance and one-sided limited liability reduces to nding  such that
8(i;ai;bi;i); vi(;bi) 
X
a i
(a)i(a)  Pr(a;bi;i);
8(a;s);
n X
i=1
i(a;s) = 0;
8(i;a;s); i(a;s)  zi:
The dual of this metering problem subject to one-sided limited liability is given by:
max
;0;
X
i2I
vi(;i)  
X
(i;a;s)
i(a;s)zi s.t. 8(i;a;s); (a)Pr(sja;i) = (a;s) + i(a;s);
36where i(a;s) is a multiplier on the liability constraint for player i at (a;s). Adding the
dual equations with respect to s implies  
P
s i(a;s) =
P
s (a;s) for all (i;a). Therefore,
 
X
(i;s)
i(a;s)zi =
X
(i;s)
(a;s)zi = b z
X
s2S
(a;s);
where b z =
P
i zi, so we may eliminate i(a;s) from the dual and get the equivalent problem:
max
0;
X
i2I
vi(;i) + b z
X
(a;s)
(a;s) s.t. 8(i;a;s); (a)Pr(sja;i)  (a;s):
Any two liability proles z and z0 with b z = b z0 lead to this dual with the same value. 
Theorem 12. Enforcing a correlated strategy  subject to budget balance, participation
and one-sided limited liability reduces to nding a solution  to the following linear system:
8(i;ai;bi;i); vi(;bi) 
X
a i
(a)i(a)  Pr(a;bi;i);
8(a;s);
X
i2I
i(a;s) = 0;
8i 2 I;
X
a2A
(a)(vi(a)   i(a)  Pr(a))  0;
8(i;a;s); i(a;s)  zi:
The rst family of constraints imposes incentive compatibility, the second budget balance,
the third individual rationality, and the last corresponds to one-sided limited liability. The
dual of this metering problem is given by the following program, where , ,  and 
represent the respective multipliers on each of the primal constraints.
max
;;0;
X
i2I
vi(;i)  
X
i2I
ivi()  
X
(i;a;s)
i(a;s)zi s.t.
8(i;a;s); (a)Pr(sja;i) = (a;s) + i(a)Pr(sja) + i(a;s):
Adding the dual constraints with respect to s 2 S, it follows that
 
X
(a;s)
i(a;s) =
X
(a;s)
(a;s) + i = b  + i
where b  :=
P
(a;s) (a;s). After substituting and eliminating , the dual is equivalent to
V := max
;0;
X
i2I
vi(;i)  
X
i2I
i(vi()   zi) + b b z s.t.
8(i;a;s); (a)Pr(sja;i)  (a;s) + i(a)Pr(sja):
37It is clear that Theorems 9 and 11 follow almost immediately from this linear program.
Now,  is enforceable if and only if V = 0, i.e., if and only if for any dual-feasible (;;)
such that
P
i vi(;i) > 0, we have that
X
i2I
vi(;i) 
X
i2I
i(vi()   zi) + b b z:
Finally, since the dual objective is decreasing in , an optimal solution for  must solve
b  = max
s2S
fi Pr(sja)   Pr(sja;bi;i)g:
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 7. Given the dual problem from the proof of Theorem 12, the rst statement
follows because if vi()  zi then the objective function is decreasing in i and reducing i
relaxes the dual constraints. The second statement follows by rewriting the objective as
X
i2I
vi(;i)  
X
i2Int
i(vi()   zi) + b 
X
i2I
zi;
where t is the set of players whose participation constraint won't bind (
i = 0 for i 2 t). 
B Lemmata
Lemma B.1. A monitoring technology satises DUD if
8(i;ai;si); Pr(ai;si) = 2 conefPr(bi;ti) : (bi;ti) 6= (ai;si)g;
where cone stands for the set of positive linear combinations of fPr(bi;ti) : (bi;ti) 6= (ai;si)g.
Proof. If DUD fails then there exists i such that i(bi;ijai) > 0 for some ai 6= bi and
8(a;s); Pr(sja) =
X
(bi;i)
X
ti2 1
i (si)
i(bi;ijai)Pr(s i;tija i;bi)
=
X
(bi;ti)
X
fi:i(ti)=sig
i(bi;ijai)Pr(s i;tija i;bi):
Write i(ai;si;bi;ti) :=
P
fi:i(ti)=sig i(bi;ijai). By construction, i(ai;si;bi;ti)  0 is
strictly positive for some ai 6= bi and satises
8(i;a;s); Pr(sja) =
X
(bi;ti)
i(ai;si;bi;ti)Pr(s i;tija i;bi):
38Without loss, i(ai;si;ai;si) = 0 for some (ai;si). Indeed, if i(ai;si;ai;si) = 1 for all
(ai;si), then the equation above is violated because i is disobedient by hypothesis and
probabilities are non-negative. If i(ai;si;ai;si) 6= 1 then subtract i(ai;si;ai;si)Pr(sja)
from both sides of the equation and divide by 1   i(ai;si;ai;si). Therefore, Pr(ai;si) 2
conefPr(bi;ti) : (bi;ti) 6= (ai;si)g for some (ai;si). 
Lemma B.2. A monitoring technology satises IOP if
8(i;j;a;s);
X
(bi;ti)
i(ai;si;bi;ti)Pr(s i;tija i;bi) =
X
(bj;tj)
j(aj;sj;bj;tj)Pr(s j;tjja j;bj)
and   0 implies that for every player i, i(ai;si;bi;ti) = 0 whenever ai 6= bi.
Proof. If IOP fails then there exists   0 and  such that i(ai;bi;i) > 0 for some
ai 6= bi;i and
8(i;a;s);
X
(bi;i)
i(ai;bi;i)(Pr(sja i;bi;i)   Pr(sja)) = (a;s);
By adjusting i(ai;ai;i) if necessary, assume without loss that
P
(bi;i) i(ai;bi;i) =  for
some constant , for every i and ai. Therefore,
8(i;a;s);
X
(bi;i)
i(ai;bi;i)Pr(sja i;bi;i) = Pr(sja)   (a;s):
The result follows now by the same argument as for Lemma B.1 above. 
Lemma B.3. Consider the following linear program.
V(z) := min
0;p;
p s.t.
X
a2A
(a) = p;
8(i;a;s);  ((a) + (1   p)(a))z  i(a;s)  ((a) + (1   p)(a))z;
8(i;ai;bi;i);
X
a i
((a) + (1   p)(a))vi(a;bi) 
X
a i
i(a)  Pr(a;bi;i):
The correlated strategy  is approximately enforceable if and only if V(z) ! 0 as z ! 1.
The dual of the above linear program is given by the following problem:
V(z) = max
0;
X
i2I
vi(;i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k s.t.
8a 2 A;  
X
i2I
vi(a;i)   z
X
i2I
kPr(a;i)k;
X
i2I
vi(;i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k = 1 + :
39Proof. The rst family of primal constraints require  to be adapted to +(1 p), so for
any z, (;p;) solves the primal if and only if  + (1   p) is exactly enforceable with .
(Since correlated equilibrium exists, the primal constraint set is clearly nonempty, and for
nite z it is also clearly bounded). The rst statement now follows. The second statement
follows by a lengthy but standard manipulation of the primal to obtain the above dual. 
Lemma B.4. Consider the following family of linear programs indexed by " > 0 and z  0.
F"
(z) := max
0
min
2(A)
X
i2I
vi(;i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k s.t.
X
i2I
vi(;i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k  ":
F"
(z) !  1 as z ! 1 for some " > 0 if and only if  is approximately enforceable.
Proof. The dual of the problem dening F"
(z) is
F"
(z) = min
;0;x
 " s.t.
X
a2A
(a) = 1;
8(i;a;s);  ((a) + (a))z  xi(a;s)  ((a) + (a))z;
8(i;ai;bi;i);
X
a i
((a) + (a))vi(a;bi) 
X
a i
xi(a)  Pr(a;bi;i):
Since clearly " > 0 does not aect the dual feasible set, if F"
(z) !  1 for some " > 0 then
there exists z  0 such that  > 0 is feasible, and  ! 1 as z ! 1. Therefore, F"
(z) !  1
for every " > 0. If V(z) = 0 for some z we are done by monotonicity of V. Otherwise,
suppose that V(z) > 0 for all z > 0. Let (;) be an optimal dual solution for V(z)
in Lemma B.3. By optimality,  = min2(A)
P
i vi(;i)   z
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)k.
Therefore, by the second dual constraint in V(z) of Lemma B.3,
V(z) = 1 +  = 1 + FV(z)
 (z) = 1   V(z);
where  is an optimal solution to the dual with " = V(z). Rearranging, V(z) = 1=(1+).
Finally, F"
(z) !  1 as z ! 1 if and only if  ! 1, if and only if V(z) ! 0. 
Lemma B.5. Fix any " > 0. If Pr satises DUDB, where B = supp , then for every
C  0 there exists z  0 such that G(z)  C, where vi(ai) := max(a i;bi)fvi(a;bi)g,
vi(ai;i) := vi(ai) X
(ai;bi6=ai;i)
i(ai;bi;i); and
G(z) := max
0
X
(i;a)
kvi(ai;i)k   z
X
(i;a)
kPr(a;i)k s.t.
8i 2 I;ai = 2 Bi; i(ai) = 0; and
X
i2I
vi(;i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k  ":
40Proof. The dual of this problem is given by
G(z) = min
0;x
 " s.t.
8(i;a;s);  (1 + (a))z  xi(a;s)  (1 + (a))z;
8(i;ai 2 Bi;bi;i);
X
a i
(a)vi(a;bi) + 1fai6=bigvi(ai) 
X
a i
xi(a)  Pr(a;bi;i);
where 1fbi6=aig = 1 if bi 6= ai and 0 otherwise. This problem looks almost exactly like the
dual for F"
(z) except that the incentive constraints are only indexed by ai 2 Bi. Now,
DUDB is equivalent to PSIB, i.e., there is an incentive scheme x : I AS ! R such that
8(i;ai;bi;i); 0 
X
a i
xi(a)  Pr(a;bi;i)
with a strict inequality whenever ai 2 Bi and ai 6= bi. Hence, by scaling x appropriately,
there is a feasible dual solution with  > 0, so G(z) < 0. Moreover, for any  > 0, clearly
an x exists with
P
a i (a)vi(a;bi)+1fbi6=aigvi(ai) 
P
a i xi(a)Pr(a;bi;i) on all
(i;ai 2 Bi;bi;i) by PSIB, so there exists z to make such  feasible. In particular,   C="
is feasible for some z, as required. 
Lemma B.6. If Pr satises DUDB, then there exists a nite z  0 such that
8i 2 I;ai 2 Bi;i  0;
X
a i
vi(ai;i)   z kPr(a;i)k  0:
Proof. Given i, ai 2 Bi, plug (a) = 1=jA ij for all a i in the proof of Theorem 7 (iii). 
Call  extremely detectable if i(ai) cannot be written as a positive linear combination
involving undetectable deviations (possibly mixed) for every (i;ai). Let E denote the set
of all such extremely detectable .
Lemma B.7. The set De = f 2 E : 8(i;ai);
P
(bi;i) i(ai;bi;i) = 1g is compact.
Proof. De is clearly a bounded subset of Euclidean space, so it remains to show that it is
closed. Consider a sequence fmg  De such that m ! . For any  2 D, let
p() := max
0p1;i2D
fp : 0 is undetectable, p0 + (1   p)1 = g:
This is a well-dened linear program with a compact constraint set and nite values, so p
is continuous in . By assumption, p(m) = 0 for all m, so p() = 0, hence  2 De. 
Lemma B.8. Let De be the set of extremely detectable deviation plans.
 := min
e2De
X
(i;a)
kPr(a;e
i)k > 0:
41Proof. If De = ; then  = +1. If not, De is compact by Lemma B.7, so there is no
sequence f
e;m
i g  De with kPr(a;
e;m
i )k ! 0 for all (i;a) as m ! 1, hence  > 0. 
Lemma B.9. Let De
i = projiDe. There exists a nite z  0 such that
8i 2 I;ai = 2 Bi;e
i 2 De
i ;
X
a i
vi(ai;e
i)   z kPr(a;e
i)k  0:
Proof. Let kvk = max(i;a;bi) jvi(a;bi)j. If z  kvk=, with  as in Lemma B.8, then
8(i;ai);
X
a i
vi(ai;e
i) z kPr(a;e
i)k  kvk z
X
a i
kPr(a;e
i)k  kvk 
kvk

:
The right-hand side clearly equals zero, which establishes the claim. 
Lemma B.10. Fix any " > 0. If Pr satises DUDB then for every C  0 there exists
z  0 such that for every   0 with
X
i2I
vi(;i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k  ";
there exists  2 (A) such that
W(;) :=
X
i2I
vi(;i)   z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k  C:
Proof. Rewrite W(;) by splitting it into three parts, Wd(;), We(;) and Wu(;):
Wd(;) =
X
i2I
X
ai2Bi
X
a i
(a)(vi(a;i)   z kPr(a;i)k)
We(;) =
X
i2I
X
ai= 2Bi
X
a i
(a)(vi(a;e
i)   z kPr(a;e
i)k);
Wu(;) =
X
i2I
X
ai= 2Bi
X
a i
(a)(vi(a;u
i )   z kPr(a;u
i )k);
and  = e + u with e extremely detectable, u undetectable. Since u is undetectable,
Wu(;) =
X
i2I
X
ai= 2Bi
X
a i
(a)vi(a;u
i )
Let 0(a) = 1=jAj for every a. By Lemma B.5, there exists z with Wd(0;)  C for
every , and by Lemma B.9 there exists z with We(0;)  0 for every . Therefore, if
Wu(0;)  0 we are done. Otherwise, for every i and ai;bi 2 Ai, let 0
i(ai) = 1=jAij and
1
i(bi) :=
X
(ai;i)
u
i (ai;bi;i)
P
(b0
i;0
i) u
i (ai;b0
i;0
i)
0
i(ai)
42Iterate this rule to obtain a sequence fm
i g with limit 1
i 2 (Ai). By construction, 1
i is
a u
i -stationary distribution (Nau and McCardle, 1990; Myerson, 1997). Therefore, given
any a i, the deviation gains for every player equal zero, i.e.,
X
(ai;bi;i)
1
i (ai)u
i (ai;bi;i)(vi(a i;bi)   vi(a)) = 0:
Let m(a) :=
Q
i m
i (ai) for all m. By construction, Wu(1;u) = 0. We will show that
Wd(1;)  C and We(1;)  0. To see this, notice rstly that, since u
i is undetectable,
for any other player j 6= i, any j  0 and every action prole a 2 A,
kPr(a;j)k = kPr(a;u
i ;j)k  kPr(a;b u
i ;j)k;
where b u
i (ai;bi;i) =
P
i u
i (ai;bi;i) and b u
i (ai;bi;i) = 0 for all i 6= i,
Pr(a;u
i ;j) =
X
(bj;j)
j(aj;bj;j)
X
(bi;i)
u
i (ai;bi;i)(Pr(a;bi;i;bj;j)   Pr(a;bi;i));
and Pr(sja;bi;i;bj;j) =
P
tj2 1
j (sj) Pr(s j;tjja j;bj;bi;i). Secondly, notice that
8i 2 I;ai 2 Bi;
X
a i
m(a)(vi(a;i)   z kPr(a;i)k) 
m
i (ai)
X
a i
m
 i(a i)(vi(ai;i)   z kPr(a;i)k) 
m
i (ai)
X
a i
0
 i(a i)(vi(ai;i)   z kPr(a;i)k) 
X
a i
0(a)(vi(ai;i)   z kPr(a;i)k):
Indeed, the rst inequality is obvious. The second one follows by repeated application of
the previously derived inequality kPr(a;i)k  kPr(a;b u
j;i)k for each player j 6= i
separately m times. The third inequality follows because (i) m
i (ai)  0
i(ai) for all m and
ai 2 Bi, since Bi is a b u
i -absorbing set, and (ii)
P
a i vi(ai;i)   z kPr(a;i)k  0 for
every (i;ai) by Lemma B.6. Therefore, Wd(1;)  Wd(m;)  Wd(0;)  C. Thirdly,
8i 2 I;ai = 2 Bi;
X
a i
m
 i(a i)(vi(a;e
i)   z kPr(a;e
i)k) 
X
a i
m
 i(a i)(vi(ai;e
i)   z kPr(a;e
i)k) 
X
a i
0
 i(a i)(vi(ai;e
i)   z kPr(a;e
i)k)  0:
The rst inequality is again obvious, the second inequality follows by repeated application
of kPr(a;i)k  kPr(a;b u
j;i)k, and the third one follows from Lemma B.9. Hence,
We(m;)  0 for every m, therefore We(1;)  0. This completes the proof. (This
proof extends Nau and McCardle (1990) and Myerson (1997) by including transfers.) 
43Lemma B.11. The conditions of Theorem 8 imply that for every " > 0 there exists  > 0
such that
P
i vi(;i)  " implies that
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)k   for some  2 (A)
with
P
i vi(;i)  z
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)k.
Proof. Otherwise, there exists " > 0 such that for every  > 0 some  exists with
P
i vi(;
i)  " but
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)k <  whenever  2 (A) satises the given
inequality
P
i vi(;i)  z
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)k. If  is bounded for every  then
fg has a convergent subsequence with limit 0. But this 0 violates the conditions of
Theorem 8, so assume that fg is unbounded. A deviation plan r
i is called relatively
undetectable if
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)k = 0 whenever  2 (A) satises
P
i vi(;i) 
z
P
(i;a) (a)kPr(a;i)k. Call Dr
i the set of relatively undetectable plans. A deviation
plan s
i is called relatively detectable if
max
(p;i;r
i)
fp : pr
i + (1   p)i = s
i;i 2 Di;r
i 2 Dr
i ;p 2 [0;1]g = 0:
Let Ds
i be the set of relatively detectable plans. By the same argument as for Lemma B.7,
Ds
i is a compact set, therefore, by the same argument as for Lemma B.8,
s
i := min
s
i2Ds
i
max
2(A)
8
<
:
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;s
i)k :
X
i2I
vi(;i)  z
X
(i;a)
(a)kPr(a;i)k
9
=
;
> 0:
Without loss, 
i = 
r;
i + 
s;
i , where 
r;
i is relatively undetectable and 
s;
i is relatively
detectable. By assumption, 
r;
i is -unprotable, so
P
(bi;i) 
s;
i (ai;bi;i) is bounded below
by  > 0, say. (Otherwise,
P
i vi(;
i) < " for small  > 0.) But this implies that
max
2(A)
X
(i;a)
(a)
 
Pr(a;
i)
 
 = max
2(A)
X
(i;a)
(a)
 
Pr(a;
s;
i )
 
  s
i > 0:
But this contradicts our initial assumption, which establishes the result. 
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